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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KANAWHA AND HOCKING COAL 
AND COKE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, a municipal 
corporation, and CENTENNIAL 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment 
finding plaintiff to be the owner of the surface rights, 
defendant Carbon County to be the owner of coal rights, 
and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. 
From such judgment plaintiff appeals. 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and a 
judgment in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law, or, in 
the alternative, a mandate that the case should be tried. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action in the lower court was originally filed 
by North American Coal Corporation, a corporation, to 
Case No. 
13853 
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quiet title to a tract of ground in Carbon County de-
scribed a s : 
Township 13 South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, in Section 8: Lot 2 (NWy4NEi/4); Lot 
3 (NEy 4 NWy 4 ) ; SWy4 of NEy 4 ; NWy4 of SEy 4 ; 
SEy4 of Nwy4; NEy4 of swy4 . 
While the suit was pending, North American Coal Cor-
poration sold and conveyed the premises in question to 
Kanawha & Hocking Coal and Coke Company (E.21) 
and pursuant to stipulation of the parties and order of 
the lower court, Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Com-
pany was substituted as plaintiff (R.24). 
By their answers, both defendants admit that the 
plaintiff is the owner of the surface of the land described 
in plaintiff's complaint. Both defendants deny that 
plaintiff owns the coal underlying said premises and 
Carbon County alleges that it is the owner of said coal 
rights pursuant to two tax sales. The first of these 
sales was for unpaid taxes for the year 1932 and the sale 
was followed by the final May sale and an auditor's 
deed recorded May 26, 1937 in Book D of Auditor's 
Deeds at Page 185. This sale covers a portion of the 
premises described as : 
Lots 2 and 3 and the Southwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter and the Southeast quarter of 
the Northwest quarter, Section 8, Township 13 
South, Eange 10 East, SLM. 
The second preliminary tax sale was for the 1944 taxes 
and was followed by final May sale and an auditor's 
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endorsement, recorded June 13,1949 as Entry No. 55783. 
The second sale covers the following portion of the 
premises: 
The NW14SW14; NEy4SWy4 , Section 8, Town-
ship 13 South, Range 10 East, SLM. 
See (E.7) and exhibits 1 and 2. 
By amendment to answer Defendant Carbon County 
alleged that plaintiff's complaint is barred by the limita-
tions set forth in Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The plaintiff's predecessor in title was the Utah 
Fuel Company which owned all of the acreage in ques-
tion. On December 23, 1932, Utah Fuel deeded the sur-
face of the property together with other lands to the 
Utah Grazing Lands Company by deed recorded in Book 
5-N of Deeds at Page 411. Under date of August 31, 
1950, Utah Grazing Lands Company reconveyed the sur-
face of the premises to Utah Fuel Company by deed re-
corded in Book 5-Y of Deeds, Page 573, in the office of 
the County Recorder of Carbon County, Utah. 
Pursuant to Requests for Admissions and Interro-
gatories, the plaintiff set forth its claims as to the in-
validity of the tax sales in question (R. 28-29) and also 
set forth in detail the facts which constituted actual 
possession of the surface of the premises (R.29). Plain-
tiff also admitted that from 1951 to the time of filing the 
Answers, plaintiff had not conducted any drilling opera-
tion, nor had the plaintiff or its predecessors entered 
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into the coal seam underlying the premises. The answers 
to the Interrogatories further reveal that during this 
period of time, no taxes were assessed on the coal rights 
and plaintiff paid no taxes. 
The plaintiff submitted Interrogatories to the de-
fendant Centennial Development Company (K.ll-12). 
Objections were filed to these Interrogatories (R.13). 
After hearing, the objections were sustained (R.18-19) 
and none of the Interrogatories were answered. 
The defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment in reliance on the answers to the interrogatories 
and admissions. For the purpose of this motion the in-
validity of the tax sales was admitted. 
Following argument on the defendants' motion, the 
court entered a Summary Judgment finding that the 
plaintiff is the owner of the surface of the premises in 
question; that the defendant Carbon County is the owner 
of the coal rights underlying the property and dismissing 
the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice (R.55-56). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LIMI-
TATION STATUTES AS THERE HAS BEEN NO 
SEVERANCE OF TITLE. 
Appellant has searched in vain for Utah cases speci-
fically dealing with the situation presented here. The 
Utah cases on the subject deal with surface rights where 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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taxes were assessed and paid and either the legal title 
holder or the tax title claimant asserted actual physical 
possession of the premises. 
The only defense relied upon by both defendants is 
that the plaintiff's action is barred by the provisions of 
Section 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. These sections provide as follows: 
"78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven 
years — Provisio — Tax title. No action for the 
recovery of real property or for the possession 
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff 
or his predecessor was seized or possessed of 
such property within seven years from the com-
mencement of such action; provided, however, 
that with respect to actions or defenses brought 
or interposed for the recovery or possession of 
or to quiet title or determine the ownership of 
real property against the holder of a tax title to 
such property, no such action or defense shall be 
commenced or interposed more than four years 
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or 
transfer creating such tax title unless the person 
commencing or interposing such action or defense 
or his predecessor has actually occupied or been 
in possession of such property within four years 
prior to the commencement or interposition of 
such action or defense or within one year from 
the effective date of this amendment. 
"78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title — Limitations of 
action or defense—Proviso. No action or defense 
for the recovery or possession of real property 
or to quiet title or determine the ownership there-
of shall be commenced or interposed against the 
holder of a tax title after the expiration of four 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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years from the date of the sale, conveyance or 
transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly 
to any other purchaser thereof at any public or 
private tax sale and after the expiration of one 
year from the date of this act. Provided, however, 
that this section shall not bar any action or de-
fense by the owner of the legal title to such pro-
perty where he or his predecessor has actually 
occupied or been in actual possession of such pro-
perty within four years from the commencement 
or interposition of such action or defense. And 
provided further, that this section shall not bar 
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the 
holder of a tax title to the effect that such city 
or town holds a lien against such property which 
is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of 
such tax title." 
The plaintiff has alleged and the defendants admit 
that the plaintiff is now and at all times has been the 
fee owner of the surface of the lands in question. This 
was expressly found by the trial court in its Summary 
Judgment. In their memorandum sujyporting the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the defendants recognize the 
general rule as set forth in an annotation 35 ALE2d 
129: 
"Where there is no severance of the title to the 
surface estate from title to the underlying mineral 
estate, adverse possession of the surface for the 
statutory period gives title to the minerals by 
adverse possession.'' 
Following this statement of the rule are numerous cita-
tions from various states. 
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I t is the plaintiff's position that this rule is appli-
cable, and therefore, the plaintiff's admitted continuous 
possession of the surface constitutes possession of the 
subsurface minerals. The limitations statutes, thus by 
their own terms, do not apply to bar the action since 
plaintiff was in possession as required under the statute. 
The defendants have shown no severance of title 
to the surface estate from title to the underlying min-
erals. 
For a severance to be effected, there must be a 
valid deed or conveyance. 
In Gill vs. Colton (4th Circuit, 1926) 12 Fed. 2d 531, 
the Court held that there was no severance of the mineral 
and surface estate because a deed purporting to sever 
the premises w a^s not accepted by the grantee; a third 
party had already contracted to purchase the property 
and he had no notice of the unrecorded deed. Going on, 
the court states the general rule: 
"Unless there has been a severance, it is a general 
presumption that one who has possession of the 
surface, has possession of the sub-soil also." 
In Morse vs. Shackelford (6th Circuit, 1926) 9 Fed. 
2d 907, the court held that an attempted severance of a 
mineral and surface title was ineffective where the gran-
tor had already conveyed without reservation. I t is 
further stated that : 
"The first grantee, by possession of the surface 
also had possession of the minerals." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Rio Bravo Oil Company vs. Staley Oil Company, 
138 Tex. 198, 158 SW2d 293, the court held that when 
adverse possession sets limitation statutes in motion to 
mature title to the surface estate in a claimant, execu-
tion and delivery of a mineral lease by another, even 
during the period that the limitations are so running, 
will not operate as a severance so as to defeat the claim-
ant's title to the mineral estate, as well as the surface 
estate. The court stated: "Only an effective deed will 
operate to sever the two estates." (Emphasis added) 
See also to the same effect on the matter of severance 
Redmond vs. Cass (1907) 226 111. 120, 80 NE 708. 
In Piersonvs. Case (1961), 272 Ala. 527, 133 South-
ern 2d 239, a purchaser under an invalid tax deed sued 
to quiet title showing exclusive possession of the surface. 
The court held that such adverse possession of surface 
under color of title inured to the benefit of mineral 
claimants — the grantees of the surface claimant. The 
basis of the holding was that there could only be a sever-
ance by the legal owner. 
Hwisley vs. Valter, 12 111. 2d 608,147 NE2d 356 holds 
that adverse possession of the surface will inure to the 
benefit of mineral interests which were separated subse-
quent to the commencement of adverse possession. The 
court states that this is not in conflict with holdings 
that where severance occurs prior to adverse possession 
commencing the possession of the surface does not itself 
result in prescriptive rights to the minerals. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LIMI-
TATION STATUTES SINCE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT 
BEEN DISPOSSESSED. 
As stated in Volume 1, Thompson on Real Property, 
page 131: 
"I t is the right of the owner of the freehold estate 
to the possession and enjoyment thereof and pos-
session is presumed unless the contrary is shown." 
(Citing Ownbey vs. Parkway Properties, 222 NC 
54, 21 SE2d 900) 
"Actual possession of a portion of a tract of land 
by the rightful and legal owner of the entire tract, 
constitutes constructive possession of the whole, 
but such possession continues unimpaired so long 
as there is not, in fact, an actual possession and 
occupancy by one claiming title by adverse posses-
sion." (Citing Acosta vs. Nunez (La. App.), 5 
Southern 2d 574) 
Seisin once established is presumed to continue un-
til contrary is proved. (Tesar vs. Bartels, 148 Neb. 889, 
32 NW2d 911, 2 ALR2d 1037) 
Speaking of what is necessary to show possession 
of subsurface minerals, it is said in Thompson on Real 
Property, Vol. 1A, page 77, that i t : 
" . . . must be actual, notorious, exhaustive, con-
tinuous and hostile for the statutory period in the 
same manner as a stranger. Actual possession is 
shown by opening and operating the mine and the 
possession is continuous if the operation is car-
ried on at such seasons as the nature of the work 
permits or the custom of the neighborhood re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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quires. I t is not required that the act of owner-
ship should be done every day or month or at any 
definite intervals, but they should be of such 
frequency and character that they would at all 
times apprise the owner that his seisin is being 
interrupted and his title endangered." (Citing 
Calvat vs. Jukm, 119 Col. 561, 206 P2d 600; Vor-
hes vs. Dennison, 300 Ken. 427, 189 SW2d 269; 
Rose vs. Martin, 310 Ken. 193, 220 SW2d 385; 
Gordon vs. Park, 219 Mo. 600, 117 SW 1163) 
In Moore vs. Empire Land Company (1913), 181 
Ala. 344, 61 Southern 940, a fee owner of land conveyed 
the surface separate and apart from the minerals and 
the grantee and his successors were in actual possession 
of the surface with no one in the actual possession of 
the minerals. The court held that adverse possession of 
the surface gave title by adverse possession to the mine-
mis pointing out that the conveyance of the surface 
separate and apart from the minerals was a legal fiction 
and in the absence of physical possession of the mineral 
interest distinct from possession of the surface, did not 
operate to sever the possession of the mineral rights and 
the rights being held by the possessor of the surface. 
Consequently, in absence of a physical severance, the 
possession of the minerals went with and followed the 
possession of the surface. 
Where a person in possession of mineral land con-
tinues his possession for the full length of the limitation 
period, a deed executed by him during his possession 
which severs the mineral rights from the surface does 
not stop the running of the statute of limitations in 
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favor of the mineral rights. Kilpatrich vs. Gulf Produc-
tion Company (1940 Tex.), 139 SW2d 653. To the same 
effect see Crawford vs. Humble Oil and Refining Com-
pany (1941 Tex.), 150 SW2d 849. 
In 35 ALR2d at page 149 the general rule is stated 
that where a person is in adverse possession of unsevered 
mineral land and the owner of land or the one in actual 
adverse possession conveys or leases the mineral estate, 
the adverse possession will continue in the same manner 
as if there had been no conveyance or release. Cited in 
support of this general rule are cases from Alabama, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vir-
ginia. 
As stated in Vol. 1A, Thompson on Real Property, 
Mines and Minerals, Section 165 at page 76: 
"Where the adverse possession of the surface 
commences before the mineral severance by the 
title holder, the adverse possession continues to 
own against the mineral severance/' Huddleston 
vs. Peel, 238 Miss. 798, 119 Southern 2d 921, 120 
Southern 2d 776; Birdwell vs. American Bonding 
Company (Tex. Civil App.), 337 SW2d 120. 
In Payne vs. Fruh Company (North Dakota, 1959) 
98 NW2d 27, is there held that where one jDerson owned 
the surface and subsurface until after the accrual of 
taxes and issuance of a deed to the county, the tax title 
constituted a title to the entire land, including the mine-
rals. Possession of the surface under the tax title con-
stituted possession of the minerals even though there was 
a mineral conveyance after the date of the tax deed. This 
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case is the reverse of the present situation, where the 
minerals were sold for taxes although the title holder 
owned both the surface and subsurface. 
In Huntington City, a municipal corporation vs. C. 
W. Peterson, 30 Ut2d 408, 518 P2d 1246, this court de-
cided : 
"Until levy and assessment are made, there is no 
tax lien on realty; but when made, the tax relates 
back to the owner as of January 1st of the taxable 
year." 
On January 1, 1932 title to all of the premises described 
in the complaint, both surface and subsurface, was vested 
in Utah Fuel Company. Not until December of 1932 was 
the surface title conveyed by Utah Fuel Company to 
Utah Grrazing Lands Company. The rule laid down in 
Payne vs. Fruh Company Supra is therefore applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court should be re-
vised since the plaintiff's cause of action is not barred 
by the statutes of limitation. Plaintiff and its predeces-
sors have admittedly always owned and been in posses-
sion of the surface of the property in question. The de-
fendants have shown no severance of title, which can 
only occur by a valid conveyance or reservation. The 
tax sales are admittedly invalid and therefore cannot 
constitute a severance of the subsurface and surface 
estates. Even if this were the case, as to the 1932 tax 
sale, the authorities are clear that where the fee owner 
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is in possession of the surface prior to a mineral sever-
ance, such possession continues against the mineral 
severance. Furthermore, there has been no dispossession 
of the record owner nor taking possession by the tax title 
claimant and under the authorities, possession in the 
owner of the fee title is presumed to continue under such 
circumstances. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judg-
ment should be reversed and the case remanded with 
directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants to quiet plaintiff's title to the 
mineral rights. In the alternative, the mandate should 
be that the case be fully tried. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALLACE D. HUED 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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